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of Performance:  The Evidence on Takeovers Re-Examined. 
 
Abstract 
 
Using the UK as a “natural experiment” that allows examination of the effect of the form of 
payment separately from bidder hostility in a way not easily achievable in the US, we show that 
the form of payment hypothesis interacts with bid hostility, or “disciplinary bidding” in 
explaining acquirer wealth effects.  Equity financed acquisitions and non-hostile bids generate 
negative returns, and their combination in a bid is particularly detrimental.  Overall, neither cash 
financing nor bidder hostility generate positive abnormal returns.  However, there is some 
evidence that the combination of cash financing and hostility that uniquely generates positive 
shareholder returns. 
 
In using this experimental arena, we note that recent UK research has produced conflicting 
evidence on the previously documented stock market ‘anomaly’ of acquiring firms exhibiting 
substantial negative abnormal returns following acquisitions.  This raises the intriguing question 
as to whether or not the UK experience is different from that of the US, where negative abnormal 
returns to acquirers is now well-established (Agrawal et al [1992], Loughran and Vijh [1997]). 
 
We show that when tests are used which control for the skewness and bias in the estimation of 
long run abnormal returns, as prescribed in Lyon et al (1999), the negative performance of UK 
acquiring companies documented by Limmack (1991), Kennedy and Limmack (1996), Gregory 
(1997) and Conn et al (2004) is confirmed.  The evidence here shows that the magnitude of these 
abnormal returns may have been under-estimated by previous studies. In line with previous 
research, we find support for the form of payment hypothesis (Aggrawal and Jaffe, 2000), but 
also show the combination of form of the bid and form of payment is a critical factor in 
determining post bid returns. We also show that these results are robust to specifications which 
control for performance conditional upon time-varying risk and expected return measures and for 
returns calculated in calendar rather than event time.   
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Biases in Estimating Long Run Abnormal Returns and Conditional Measures 
of Performance:  The Evidence on Takeovers Re-Examined. 
 
I. Introduction 
Despite mixed evidence on whether shareholders actually benefit from acquisitions, the level of 
acquisition and merger activity appeared to accelerate rather than decelerate in the run-up to the 
new millennium.  Furthermore, the UK and Europe became the focus of some  deals hitherto 
unprecedented in scale during that period.  For example, in 1999, Securities Data Corporation 
records that 41% of the $855bn first quarter global acquisition and merger volume occurred in 
Europe, as opposed to 30% one year previously.  Examples included the BP Amoco deal, BP-
Amoco’s acquisition of Atlantic Richfield, Vodafone’s hostile acquisition of Mannesman and 
Olivetti’s hostile bid for Telecom Italia.  Historically, the UK has been by far the most important 
European market for corporate control, partly because of the comparative ease with which 
hostile bids can be made in the UK compared to other EC countries (Mayer, 1996).  In addition, 
there are similarities between the UK and US which make the former market an interesting “out-
of-sample” test for some of the research findings to emerge from the US.  Most intriguingly, 
though, there are institutional differences between the UK and the US which allow the form of 
payment hypothesis to be disentangled from the question of bidder hostility, as in contrast to the 
US position’ many hostile bids are made when the form of payment is in equity.  Put in US 
terminology, “tender offers” can be, and frequently are, financed by equity.  US studies typically 
report that mergers are much more likely to be financed with cash than tender offers.  For 
example, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) report that only 7.5% of tender offers are financed through 
stock (equity) whilst 50.7% of mergers are stock-financed.  By contrast, in our sample covering 
18 years of UK takeovers, 64.5% of hostile bids (equivalent to tender offers) are stock-financed, 
very close to the 63.2% of non-hostile bids (“mergers”) finaced in this way.  This suggests a 
“natural experiment” to disaggregate the two effects may be possible in the UK in a way that is 
not easily achievable in the US, as in the latter market the form of financing is highly correlated 
with bid hostility in a way that does not occur in the UK. 
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Given the above, the conflicting evidence from recent UK research on acquiring firms warrants 
further investigation. Gregory (1997) uses six different benchmarks, including the Fama-French 
(1996) “three factor” model, using both the product of one plus the abnormal return (Kothari and 
Warner (1997) “buy-and-hold” returns) and the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) procedures, 
together with a modified RATS approach and consistently finds significant negative 
performance.  From announcement to the 24 months post completion of the acquisition, these 
range from a significant -8.15% to a significant -18.01%.  Limmack (1991) uses three alternative  
benchmarks and finds significant returns ranging between -4.67% and -14.96% after 24 months.  
On a size-controlled basis, Kennedy and Limmack (1996) also provide evidence of under-
performance by UK acquirers with a significant -4.92% being reported for the period 12 to 24 
months post takeover.  Conn et al (2004) report abnormal returns of –19.78% after 36 months.  
In marked contrast, Franks and Harris (1989) and Higson and Elliott (1998) find no significant 
abnormal returns by UK acquirers.  Franks and Harris show a significant positive return of 
+4.5% in the 24 months following takeover when the CAPM is used to define abnormal returns, 
whilst Higson and Elliott report abnormal returns (computed on a holding period returns basis 
comparing merging firm return with an equivalent short position in the size decile benchmark) of 
-1.14% after  24 months and +0.83% after 36 months. This raises the intriguing question as to 
whether or not the UK experience is different from that of the US, where negative abnormal 
returns to acquirers is now well-established (Aggrawal et al [1992], Loughran and Vijh [1997]).  
A full survey of the literature on long-run acquirer returns in the UK and US can be found in 
Aggrawal and Jaffe (2000). 
 
Several possible explanations for the difference in findings between the various UK studies 
reported above.  The first is that the results simply reflect time-varying returns to acquisition.  To 
some degree, this would explain the difference between the Higson and Elliott (1998) results and 
those of Gregory (1997) and Limmack (1991).  Higson and Elliott report positive acquirer 
abnormal returns for the years 1981-1984, whereas Gregory (1997) covers the period 1984 to 
1992 inclusive and Conn et al (2004) 1984-1998. Apart from 1989, all other years in their study 
(1975-1990) show negative returns.  Whilst there is considerable time variation in acquirer 
abnormal returns, it is unlikely that these explain the results obtained by Higson and Elliott 
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(1998) in comparison to those presented by Limmack (1991), Gregory (1997) and Conn et al 
(2004).  
 
The second explanation is that all of the UK studies to date suffer from some form of 
measurement bias. Biases in long run abnormal returns have been documented by Kothari and 
Warner (1997), Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al (1999).  While it is more likely that such 
biases would lead to an over-estimate rather than an under-estimate of abnormal returns, these 
studies show that misspecification of abnormal returns and significance tests can lead to over-
rejection of the null hypothesis even when the test is for significant negative CARs (e.g. Kothari 
and Warner, 1997, p.309). The first contribution of this paper is to examine whether significant 
biases in the estimation of long run abnormal returns or misspecification of test statistics provide 
the explanation for the differences between US and UK studies.  We show that when tests which 
control for the skewness and bias in the estimation of long run abnormal returns are properly 
carried out, using the methods prescribed in Lyon et al (1999), the negative performance of UK 
acquiring companies documented by Limmack (1991), Kennedy and Limmack (1996) and 
Gregory (1997) is confirmed by this study.  The evidence here shows that the magnitude of these 
abnormal returns may even have been under-estimated by some previous studies.   
 
Recently, Fama (1998) has argued that many apparent anomalies in the literature either disappear 
or become far less significant when abnormal returns are estimated in calendar, rather than event, 
time.  This seems unlikely to be an explanation for the poor performance of acquirers, as 
Gregory (1997) shows that calendar time returns are more negative than event time returns.  
Furthermore, Conn et al (2004) report consistent results when calendar time returns are 
employed.  However, given the potential problems of cross-correlation in abnormal returns when 
long post event windows are used (Fama, 1998), we also report calendar time returns here.  We 
again show that significant negative abnormal returns accrue to acquiring firms.   
 
A major issue that emerges from the evidence for both UK and US studies is whether the time 
dependent pattern of acquirer performance is a reflection of genuine under-performance by 
acquirers, or whether this pattern reflects a failure to take account of time-varying expectations 
on the part of investors.  This is analogous to the problem of measuring the performance of 
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mutual fund managers where the returns required in equilibrium change over time.  In the same 
way that mean alphas can be used to measure fund manager performance, they can be used as a 
measure of abnormal returns, either in event time (Franks et al, 1991) or in calendar time 
(Loughran and Ritter, 1995).  Using both event time and calendar time alphas from the Fama-
French three-factor model as our measures of abnormal performance, we show that our results 
are robust to specifications which control for performance conditional upon time-varying risk 
and expected return.   
 
The testing of acquirer performance using Fama-French alphas in calendar time is likely to have 
low explanatory power if, as Loughran and Ritter (2000)  argue, behavioral timing is a factor in 
acquisitions.  In practice, management have discretion over both the timing of the bid and the 
method of its financing.  Loughran and Ritter (op. cit.)  contend that if firms exploit 
misvaluations through supply responses, as in the issuance of equity to finance acquisitions, then 
there will be time variation in portfolio abnormal returns.  This motivates our calculation of 
conditional and unconditional alphas in event time as well as calendar time.  
 
We report results for cash, stock and mixed financing, and for hostile and friendly bids.  We use 
this latter classification because, as Higson and Elliott (1998) note, there is no direct analogy in 
the UK to the merger/tender offer dichotomy.  Other papers have studied the effects of bidder 
hostility and form of payment, but this is the first to examine the interaction between hostility 
and form of payment. As may be expected from prior studies, acquirers offering cash perform 
better than acquirers financing deals using equity. As in Loughran and Vijh (1997), we show 
equity-financing acquirers have significantly negative abnormal returns, but by contrast UK 
cash-financing acquirers do not have significant positive abnormal returns.  Friendly acquirers 
exhibit significantly worse performance than hostile acquirers.  However, we show that the form 
of payment and bidder hostility interact to explain post-acquisition returns.  Last, in line with the 
results reported by Rau and Vermaelen (1998) we show some evidence of a “value firm effect” 
in equity-financing bidder returns. 
 
 6
Section II of the paper describes in detail the metrics used to calculate abnormal returns; Section 
III describes the sample; Section IV gives the results from our different tests of acquirer 
performance; finally, Section V summarizes the paper and draws conclusions. 
 
 
II. Models used to estimate long run abnormal returns 
 
A. Event Time methods 
Lyon et al (1999) note that the causes of misspecification include new listing or survivor bias, re-
balancing bias, and skewness bias, they demonstrate that  alternative methods are available to 
counter such biases.  One uses traditional event-time modelling with inference based on either a 
boot-strapped version of a skewness adjusted t-statistic, or on empirical probability values 
calculated from a simulated distribution of mean long-run abnormal returns estimated from 
pseudo-portfolios. The alternative method involves accumulating calendar time abnormal 
returns.  Lyon et al (1999, p. 198) note that both methods have advantages and disadvantages, 
and conclude that the “pragmatic solution” to the problem of analyzing long-run abnormal 
returns is to use both.  We follow that advice here. 
 
We first form the reference portfolios described in Lyon et al (1999) using UK data.  We then 
apply this reference portfolio technique to the set of medium to large UK takeovers (defined as 
those in excess of £10 million) for 1977 through 1992  and calculate abnormal returns for the 5 
years post takeover.  We then use both techniques used by Lyon et al (1999) to correct for 
skewness bias in the t-statistics.   
 
Given the smaller size of the UK stock market compared to the US, we form 10 x 5 reference 
portfolios, sorted on size (market capitalization) and book-to-market ratios as at the 30th June of 
the year t-1 (as in Lyon et al, 1999).  All  share returns are from the London Business School 
Share Price Database (LSPD), whilst all book-to-market ratios and market capitalization data 
are from Datastream.   Reference portfolio and acquirer firm returns are calculated using the 
“buy-and-hold” method described in Lyon et al, (1999, p. 169): 
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where s is the beginning period, τ is the period of investment in months, Rit is the return on 
security i in month t, and ns is the number of securities traded in month s, the first period for the 
return calculation.  This represents the return on a passive investment portfolio with no monthly 
rebalancing.   
 
Note that we sort on market capitalization in descending order (i.e. decile 1 contains the largest 
firms), whilst book-to-market is sorted in ascending order (i.e. quintile 1 contains low book-to-
market or “glamour” firms).  The reference portfolio returns show that there are substantial and 
non-linear size and book-to-market effects in the UK, which mirror those reported in Lyon et al 
(199, p.171).  Three main points emerge: first, for all holding periods the returns for all periods 
are monotonically decreasing in size and increasing in book-to-market.  Second, the general 
pattern of returns for size and book-to-market effects appear to be consistent between the UK 
and the US.   
 
Given the conclusions in Lyon et al (1999) that buy-and-hold reference portfolios dominate 
rebalanced reference portfolios, we define the expected return on acquirer i,  [E(Riτ)] as the 
reference portfolio buy-and-hold return given by (1).  Abnormal returns are then defined as: 
 
AR R E Ri i iτ τ= − ( τ )         (2) 
 
where ARiτ is the τ period buy-and-hold abnormal return for acquirer i, and Riτ is the τ period 
buy-and-hold return.  We then test for significance of the abnormal return using the bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic described in equation (6) of Lyon et al (1999, p. 174) and the 
pseudo-portfolio method described in Lyon et al (1999, pp. 175-176).  In all, we use 50 plus 10 
reference portfolios to form the pseudo-portfolio returns.  First, we use the 50 size and book to 
market portfolios described above.  Second, given the evidence in Loughran and Ritter (op. cit.)  
that benchmark portfolios formed on size alone capture around 90% of true abnormal returns, as 
 8
opposed to the approximately 80% captured by size and book-to-market benchmarks, we also 
report results using ten size-decile reference portfolios.1
 
An alternative measure of performance in event time is the Fama-French three factor model. The 
Fama-French model is given by: 
 
( )R R R R SMB HMLi f i i m f i iτ τ τ τ τ τ τα β γ δ ε− = + − + +  +                         i (3)  
where Rft is the monthly return on three-month UK Treasury bills, Rmτ is the return on the (value 
weighted) FT All-Share Index, SMBτ is the difference in return between small and large 
companies, and HMLτ is the difference in return between high and low book-to-market 
companies.  The SML and HML factor portfolios are formed using the universe of UK stocks for 
which market capitalizations and returns, and book-to-market ratios are available on the LSPD 
and Datastream respectively. As in the Fama-French model, portfolios are formed using end-
June book-to-market ratios and market capitalizations in year t+1, with returns being 
accumulated from July t+1 to June t+2. We use a UK adaptation of that model here where 
portfolios are formed in a manner similar to that employed by Gregory and McCorriston (2003).  
Whereas Fama and French use the NYSE median to form breakpoints on size, and all NYSE 
stocks to form breakpoints on book-to-market, the UK stockmarket is characterized by a large 
number of small capitalization stocks.  To avoid the problems that  would be caused by setting 
breakpoints on the median of the whole market, we use the top 350 stocks to set size and book-
to-market breakpoints.2
 
B. Calendar time method 
Calendar time portfolios are formed using the model described in Loughran and Ritter (1995) 
which employs the Fama-French three-factor model.  We form calendar-time returns on a 
                                                          
1 Note that our simulation results suggest that the pseudo-portfolio method using buy-and-hold returns yields an 
unbiased measure of long-run abnormal returns for the UK. 
2 We choose this cut-off because the FTSE includes all stocks in the top 350 companies in its FTSE 350 index, 
designed to capture the returns on small and medium size UK companies.  
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portfolio of acquirers which have, respectively, experienced an acquisition in the last twelve, 
thirty six, or sixty months.  The calendar-time returns are then used to estimate the regression: 
 
( )R R R R SMB HMLpt ft i i mt ft i t i t− = + − + +  +                           itα β γ δ ε (4)  
where Rpt is the equally-weighted monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio.  Lyon et al 
(1999, p. 193, fn.12) note that the error term may be heteroskedastic as the number of securities 
in the portfolio varies from one month to the next.  However, they find that this does not affect 
their results to any significant degree.  Nonetheless, to take account of this possibility we 
estimate the calendar time regressions using the White (1980) correction for heteroskedasticity.   
 
C. Conditional Performance Method 
Recent work has shown that the assumption of unconditional asset pricing models may be 
flawed (Jaganathan and Wang, 1995).  This appears not to have been taken into account in the 
“anomalies” literature.  If the true asset pricing process is a conditional one, a failure to take 
account of this will result in the “bad model” problem referred to in Fama (1998).  In such 
circumstances, unconditional models of stock returns could confuse abnormal performance with 
time variations in risks or risk premia.  To investigate whether the “bad model” problem has any 
role to play in explaining the performance of acquirers, we re-estimate our calendar time results 
under the assumption that coefficients are conditioned in the manner suggested in Ferson and 
Schadt (1996).  Conditioning models have not been as widely tested on UK data as in the US. 
However one study which found significant information in conditioning variables in the uk and 
other countries was due to Solnik (1993). Accordingly, we use three of the conditioning 
variables used by Solnik (1992) which are, respectively: (1) the lagged level of the one-month 
Treasury bill yield; (2) a lagged dividend yield (the yield on the FT All-Share Index); and (3) a 
lagged measure of the term structure of interest rates (the UK ten year Government Bond rate).  
Note that a quality spread variable is not available for the UK for the period of our study.  
 
In calendar time, we use a conditional Fama-French three factor model of the form: 
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where zt-1 is the vector of conditioning variables described above.   
 
Unfortunately, running (5) in event time is expensive in terms of degrees of freedom.  For our 
conditional event time regressions we therefore run the conditional model in Fama and French 
(1997) where SMB and HML are conditioned upon the previous month end log of market 
capitalization and book-to-market ratios respectively.3
 
 
III Sample data 
 
The data set consists of all successfully completed UK takeovers from 1977 to 1994 with a bid 
value of £10 million or greater.  Although this cut-off is inevitably somewhat arbitrary, the value 
has been chosen to avoid the results being excessively influenced by very small deals.  This cut-
off is also used in Gregory (1997).  The sample is drawn from the AMDATA database for all 
takeovers announced since 1984 (the date of introduction of the AMDATA service, which offers a 
comprehensive listing of all bids made by UK listed companies), and before that date from the 
Financial Times.  The additional requirements that are then imposed depend upon the model 
used.  We estimate holding period returns models where size alone is controlled for and where 
both size and book to market are controlled for (as in Lton et al., op. cit.).  For these models, we 
require that each acquirer’s share returns must be available on the LSPD for the announcement 
period and that the acquirer’s market capitalization and its book-to-market ratio must be 
available on Datastream each month.  This yields a sample of 486 acquirers.  As an additional 
model, we also estimate simple event time regressions of the form used in Franks and Harris 
(1989), which require that returns be available on the LSPD from announcement to a minimum 
of 12 months after the month of announcement of the bid.  This results in a sample of 480 
acquirers.   
                                                          
3 In contrast to Fama and French, we use absolute book-to-market ratio to condition HML rather than the log of the 
ratio, because of the small number of cases in the UK where book-to-market ratios are negative.  This is possible in 
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 Summary data on acquirers by size and book-to-market classifications are presented in Table 1 
Panel A.  Acquirers tend to be concentrated in the largest two deciles of market capitalization, 
with 63.1% of the sample falling into this category.  Only 6.1% of the sample are in the smallest 
four deciles by market capitalization.  By contrast, acquirers are fairly evenly distributed across 
book-to-market quintiles, although there is a slight tendency towards a concentration at the lower 
end of the book-to-market spectrum. Notably, only around 11.5% of the sample fall into the 
highest book-to-market quintile.   
 
Sub-analyses of the sample split cash versus non-cash, and hostile versus non-hostile are also 
reported in Table 1 Panel A.  Further analysis reveals that the size decile distribution of the cash 
sample is different from that of the non-cash sample.  Cash financing acquirers tend to be 
significantly larger than non-cash financing acquirers. Furthermore, cash acquirers tend to be 
concentrated in the middle book-to-market quintiles, whilst non-cash acquirers are 
monotonically decreasing in book-to-market quintile.  Most striking, however, is the distribution 
of type of financing across book-to-market quintile reported in Table 1, Panel B.  The proportion 
financing by equity decreases monotonically across quintiles, precisely the effect to be expected 
under the Loughran and Ritter “behavioral timing” hypothesis.  At the “glamour” end of the 
spectrum, 69.5% of bidders use equity, a further 11.9% finance by mixed offers, whilst only 
18.9% of bidders finance using cash.  In contrast, at the “value” end, Only 53.6% of bids are 
financed using equity, 14.3% use mixed offerings, whilst fully 32.1% use cash.   
 
Finally, in Table 1, Panel A, we see that the size and book-to-market distributions of hostile and 
non-hostile bidders are not significantly different from one another. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the UK because of “dirty surplus” accounting that allowed firms (pre 1997) to write off goodwill directly against 
reserves.  
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IV. Results 
A1. Event Time portfolios – basic analysis 
Our first and most simple test is to run cross-sectional Fama-French three-factor regressions and 
conditional Fama-French regressions.  These require a minimum of 12 months post-
announcement data and so can be estimated for 480 companies in our sample.  The regressions 
are run on the full 60 months post  announcement and results from the unconditional regressions 
are shown in Panel A of Table 2.  The overall alpha is significantly negative at 0.17% per month.  
The beta implies that acquirers are, on average, slightly riskier than the market average, whilst 
the three-factor coefficients show a significant positive loading on the SMB (size) risk factor but 
no significant loading on HML.  Partitioning the sample into non-cash and cash acquirers 
confirms the results from previous studies that equity acquirers have strongly negative abnormal 
performance (-0.21% per month; Table 2, Panel B), while cash acquirers have performance that 
is not significantly different from zero.  Neither are mixed bids significantly different from zero.  
Note also that the rank ordering of the form of payment is as predicted by the form of payment 
hypothesis (Aggrawal and Jaffe, 2000).  Partitioning on bid hostility shows that non-hostile bids 
are significantly negative, whilst hostile bids exhibit returns not significantly different from zero.  
Following Rau and Vermaelen (op. cit), we classify bids according to whether they are “value” 
or “glamour” bidders. However, whilst Rau and Vermaelen partition their sample on a relative 
basis (i.e. the top 50% of acquirers by BTM are “value” firms), we partition on an absolute basis 
(i.e. on the basis of the BTM quintile to which the acquirer belongs).  By this definition the 
majority of our acquirers would be “glamour” firms.   From table 2, Panel C, in keeping with 
Rau and Vermaelen’s findings, there is distinct evidence of a “glamour” effect once acquires are 
partitioned into “glamour” (quintiles 1 and 2) and “value” (quintiles 4 & 5) categories.  Overall, 
“glamour” acquirers lose a significant 0.39% per month whilst “value” acquirers gain an 
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insignificant 0.01% per month.  The sub-analysis of equity acquirers (the “glamour” acquirers of 
which would be expected to perform particularly adversely under a behavioural timing 
hypothesis [Loughran and Ritter, op. cit.]) presented in Table 2, Panel D shows that “glamour 
acquirers significantly under-perform (0.41% per month) whilst “value” acquirers exhibit no 
such under-performance. 
 
Our second group of tests use the Fama-French (1997) conditional 3-factor model.  These figures 
are reported in Table 3 and are qualitatively similar to those described above.  Overall under-
performance is a significant 0.17% per month, whilst equity bidders significantly under-perform 
(0.23% per month) as do non-hostile bidders (0.23% per month). As might be expected, 
conditioning SMB and HML reduces the difference between value and glamour returns, but not 
by much.  Glamour acquirers now show a significant -0.37% per month return, whilst value 
acquirers have an insignificant alpha equivalent to 0.07% per month.  For the equity sub-sample, 
glamour acquirers have a significant abnormal return of -0.39% per month, whilst value 
acquirers have an insignificant positive alpha equivalent to 0.02% per month. 
 
A2. Event Time portfolios – bootstrapped analysis 
The experiments conducted in Kothari and Warner (1997) provide evidence that the Fama-
French three-factor model may exhibit biases when used to estimate long-run returns.  
Furthermore, the problems which Loughran and Ritter (2000)  raise with regard to the Fama-
French model, which we discuss in Section II above, suggest that the use of Fama-French alphas, 
or a CAR approach using the three-factor model, are unlikely to yield a powerful test of under-
performance by acquirers.  For that reason, for our event-time results we prefer to rely on the 
Lyon et al analysis of acquirer returns. 
 
 14
First we use Lyon et al (1999) style buy-and-hold book-to-market and size (BTMS) reference 
portfolios, which demonstrate that acquirers exhibit substantial negative performance.  The 
results which are reported in Table 4, Panel A, columns 1-5, show negative abnormal returns of –
3.2% after 12 months and –15.1% after 36 months, rising to – 21.2% after 5 years.  Using either 
a skewness adjusted t-test, or empirical p-values based upon simulations of the pseudo-
portfolios, the abnormal returns are significantly negative in all cases.   Taking account of the 
Loughran and Ritter (op. cit.) arguments for size controls, columns 6-10 show the results when 
the ten deciles are used as the benchmark portfolios rather than the 50 BTMS portfolios.  Under 
this metric, acquirer abnormal returns are a significant –3.6%, -17.1% and –25.6% after one, 
three and five years respectively.  
 
We then analyze the BTMS matched results by book-to-market quintile in Table 4, Panel B.  In 
contrast to the results from the analysis of Jensen alphas reported in Table 2, no clear value 
versus glamour effect emerges from returns calculated on a BTMS matched basis, with the 
exception that the extreme value portfolio exhibits the highest returns across all time periods, 
with an insignificant overall 5 year return of only -0.4%.  Given the smaller number of 
observations necessarily associated with sub-dividing the sample, significance levels for the 
remaining groups are somewhat mixed, although all four remaining quintiles exhibit significant 
negative performance after 36 months, at least at the 10% level, whether pseudo-portfolio or 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics are used to calculate significance. Combining 
portfolios (not reported in Table 4) in the way described above yields a significant negative 60 
month performance of –24.9% for the “glamour” group; however, the “value” group is also 
significantly negative, though with a lower abnormal return of –19.2%.  Our way of interpreting 
this difference between the Jensen alpha analysis and the pseudo-portfolio analysis is that the 
latter shows that relative to similar book-to-market ratio firms, acquirers tend to fare badly in all 
but the highest market-to-book quintile.  However, in absolute terms, “value” acquirers do rather 
less poorly.  In essence this is because the performance of value firms in general is superior to 
that of glamour firms, although whether or not this difference represents a risk effect is an open 
question.  Gregory, Harris and Michou (2003) present evidence that there are “value” anomalies 
in the UK market that do not seem to represent risk factors.  Furthermore, in some contrast to the 
evidence presented in Liew and Vassalou (2002), it is debatable as to whether HML captures 
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macroeconomic risk, although SMB clearly does (Gregory et al, op.cit., Tables 8-10).  This 
evidence is compatible with the Loughran and Ritter (op.cit.) argument that size benchmarked 
returns may be more appropriate measures of performance than BTMS benchmarked returns – 
and as we have already demonstrated in Table 4, Panel A, the size-benchmarked abnormal 
returns are consistently worse than the BTMS-benchmarked abnormal returns.  Although the 
time period and methodology differ, our results here are in line with those reported for 1984-
1998 by Conn et al (2004), although they provide less detailed groupings and do not sub-analyze 
equity and cash acquirers.4
 
Strikingly, when we analyze the size-matched results by book-to-market quintile in Panel C of 
Table 4, we see clear evidence that the “glamour” set of acquirers exhibit economically and 
statistically significant negative returns.  BTM quintile 1 firms have abnormal returns of –10.1% 
after 12 months rising to –40.3% after 60 months, whilst BTM quintile 2 firms show returns of –
6.2% after 12 months rising to –48.6% after 60 months.  By contrast, the 60 month abnormal 
returns for the “neutral” BTM quintile 3 portfolio are only –16.6% after 60 months, compared to 
a figure of –12.7% for BTM 4 firms and +15.5% for the extreme “value” portfolio.   
 
Table 5 shows the BTMS-matched and size-matched results for equity, cash and mixed bids 
respectively.  Taking the BTMS-matched results from Panel A, for equity bids, returns are 
economically and statistically significantly negative for all time horizons under both metrics. 
Abnormal returns are –5.3% after one year, -20.7% after 3 years and go on to reach –30.5% after 
5 years.  By contrast, cash acquirers exhibit performance that is insignificantly different from 
zero.  Neither is the magnitude of the returns economically significant (-0.1% after 1 year, -2.6%  
after three years, and +5.6% after five years).  Mixed offers exhibit negative abnormal returns of 
–26.3% after 5 years, but the figure is not statistically significant, a result which partially reflects 
the low number of bidders in this class (n=59). In general, the ordering of these results provides 
support for the Aggrawal and Jaffe (op. cit.) form of payment hypothesis.   Turning to the size-
matched results in panel B of Table 5, we note that the qualitative results are identical, but 
abnormal returns are considerably more negative for the equity group (-36.4% after 60 months 
                                                          
4 The Conn et al study reports results on a control firm matched size and book-to-market basis in calendar time. 
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compared to a BTMS figure of –30.5%), slightly less for the cash-financing group, and very 
slightly worse for the mixed financing group. 
 
Given striking differences between the performances of equity and cash bidders, we analyze the 
performance of both groups by BTM quintile in Table 6.  Panel 1A shows the BTMS-matched 
quintile results for equity bidders. With the notable exception of quintile 4 bidders, abnormal 
returns are more negative in the low BTM quintiles after 60 months, with the least negative (and 
insignificant) returns being recorded by the “value” BTM group, quintile 5.  All the other 
quintile groups exhibit significant negative performance, with the 60 month returns for quintiles 
1 (glamour) through 5 (value) being –39.2%, -31.8%, -23.7% -38.1%, and –5.0% respectively.  
The evidence here is broadly supportive of the  Rau and Vermaelen “value firms” effect, but 
even “value” bidders financing by equity do poorly to some extent.  However, when we look at 
the results on a size matched basis presented in panel 1B, we see strong evidence in favor of the 
Rau and Vermaelen “value firms” effect.  Returns are monotonically decreasing as we move 
from “value” to “glamour” quintiles, with both “value” groupings showing performance 
insignificantly different from zero, whilst “neutral” and “glamour” firms have significant 
negative performance, ranging from –23.2% (significant at the 10% level under the pseudo-
portfolio method only) for BTM 3 firms, to –53.6% for BTM 4 acquirers and –59.8% for the 
extreme “glamour” set of acquirers.  The pattern of returns exhibited here is compatible with the 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) story of stock-market driven acquisitions. 
 
Turning to cash bidders, the results reported in Table 6 Panel 2A are not terribly informative 
because of the low significance levels, almost certainly driven by the small number of bidders in 
each quintile.  Combining quintiles into the “glamour” and “value” categories described above 
still fails to yield statistically significant results; the glamour cash bidders earn (statistically 
insignificant) abnormal returns of +29.5% after 60 months, whilst value cash bidders have 
(statistically insignificant) abnormal returns of –13.8% after 60 months.  A broadly similar story 
results from the size matched results reported in Panel 2B.  However, combining the cash and 
equity financing results and bearing in mind the results from Table 1, panel B, that show bidders 
appear to gear the financing of the bid according to the book-to-market quintile of the firm reveal 
a general pattern of evidence that is compatible with managers following “behavioral timing” as 
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hypothesized by Loughran and Ritter (op. cit.) and Sheifer and Vishny (op. cit.).  That is, 
managers in the “glamour” category of firms that are over-valued exploit this position by issuing 
new equity to finance bids - these acquirers subsequently under-perform significantly.  By 
contrast, managers in the “glamour” category of firms that are not over-valued have no incentive 
to exploit their position and use cash to finance bids -  these acquirers subsequently do not 
under-perform.  However, some caution is necessary arriving at this interpretation because of the 
lack of significance of the results for cash bidders in general.5
 
Results partitioned by bid hostility are presented in Table 7.  From the BTMS results reported in 
Panel A, we see that for non-hostile bidders, the long run performance is unambiguously 
negative, no matter how significance is evaluated.  Columns 3-4 of Table 7 show that non-hostile 
bidders in the UK have significant abnormal returns of –4.4% after 12 months, -18.4% after 36 
months and –23.6% after 60 months.  By contrast, the returns for hostile bidders are always 
insignificant, with the abnormal returns being –0.6%, -4.4% and –13.5% for the three horizons 
respectively.  Under the size-matched metric reported in Panel B, the conclusions for non-hostile 
bidders is identical.  Returns are somewhat more negative, at –26.5% after 60 months.  However, 
the hostile group of acquirers exhibit considerably poorer performance under this metric and 
there is weak evidence from the bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistic that this negative 
performance may be significant. 
 
The evidence from the event-time analysis thus far seems conclusive.  For acquisitions 
completed during the period 1977-1994, UK acquiring firms significantly under-performed their 
pseudo-portfolio equivalents.  This confirms the findings of Limmack (1991), Kennedy and 
Limmack (1996), and Gregory (1997), but contradicts those of Higson and Elliott (1998).  Sub-
analyzing the sample suggests that: 1. the form of payment is an important determinant of post-
bid performance, in line with US findings; 2. “friendly” bids significantly under-perform; 3. 
there is some (but not conclusive) evidence of a “glamour” firms effect in UK takeovers, but 
only the extreme quintile of value firm bidders show performance which is not significantly 
different from zero. 
                                                          
5 Note that we do not report quintile results for mixed-financing bidders because of the small number of 
observations in each quintile grouping. 
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 B.  The effects of hostility and cash offers 
 
As we noted above, the UK market facilitates the disaggregation of the effects of both the form 
of financing (equity, cash or mixed offers) and bid hostility. This can be achieved either by 
partitioning the data or by using dummy variables as independent variables in regressions with 
the Lyon et al (1999) style “buy-and-hold” abnormal returns calculated after controlling for size 
and book to market effects, as described above (N = 486). In Table 8, we present partitioned 
results.  A problem here is that the relatively small number of observations outside the largest 
group (equity financed non-hostile bids) leads to demanding levels of abnormal returns for 
significance to be established.  Nonetheless, on a BTMS-matched basis (Table 8, Panel A) we 
observe that returns for equity financing are more negative than those observed for non-equity 
acquirers, and that returns for hostile bids are greater than those associated with non-hostile bids. 
This is the case whether returns are measured at 1, 3 or 5 year intervals.  Equity financing non-
hostile acquisitions exhibit highly significant negative performance at all horizons.  Whilst 
equity financed hostile bids show economically significant returns, these are only statistically 
significant after 5 years when the skewness-adjusted t-statistic is considered.  However, on a 
size-matched basis (Table 8, Panel B) it appears that hostile equity financed bids also exhibit 
negative performance.  Under this metric, the 60 month post bid returns are –37% for non-hostile 
equity bids, and –34.1% for equity-financed hostile bids.  The performance of non-equity non-
hostile bids is not significantly different from zero under either metric.  However, the group of 
non-equity financed hostile bids exhibit 5 year abnormal returns of just over 50% under the 
BTMS-matched benchmark.  These are significant at the 10% level using the pseudo-portfolio 
significance test.   Although numbers are similar using the size-matched benchmark, at 49.5%, 
the figure just fails to be significant at the 10% level. 
 
Overall, these results suggest that although form of payment may be the dominant explanatory 
factor, the type of bid also has an important inter-active role in explaining bidder outcomes, 
particularly for cash-financed acquisitions. 
 
C.  Calendar time results 
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 One explanation for the significance of the results reported in Table 4 is that cross-sectional 
dependence of the abnormal returns causes the significance level to be overstated.  To test for 
this, we form calendar time portfolios as described above, and run the monthly regression of 
calendar time returns implied by equations (4) and (5).  The results are reported in Table 9, and 
all t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method.  As Loughran 
and Ritter (2000) argue, if managers of acquiring firms exhibit “behavioral timing” in 
formulating their decisions, then calendar time weighting will bias any experiment in favor of 
the null hypothesis.  Yet whether an unconditional or a conditional Fama-French model is used 
in the analysis, the regression results reported in Table 10 unambiguously support the 
conclusions in Table 4.  Acquirers, on average, significantly under-perform.  The magnitude of 
the returns implied by the intercept terms (between 17.4% and 18% ignoring compounding 
effects) is not much different from the 60-month event period returns reported in Table 4 (given 
the Fama-French model is being employed in calendar time, the appropriate comparisons will 
always be with the BTMS-matched returns). 
 
To confirm the form of payment hypothesis, we investigate the calendar time results for stock-
financing acquirers.  The results in calendar time confirm the fact that equity financing acquirers 
under-perform.  The intercept coefficients in Table 10 for equity acquirers (-0.37 and –0.34) 
represent 60-month returns of –22.2% and –20.4% respectively, ignoring compounding effects.  
These represent returns substantially below those of –30.5% reported in Table 5, suggesting that 
calendar time accumulation mitigates the adverse returns experienced by equity bidders.  
However, there are important weighting differences between event period returns and calendar 
time returns.  Note that there is a propensity for equity financing to correlate with returns on the 
market in general.  Thus we see more equity financing in “good” times when stock prices are 
high, and more cash financing in “bad” times when stock prices are lower.  As Loughran and 
Ritter (2000) note, calendar time portfolios thus formed are inherently biased towards supporting 
the null hypothesis.  If managers really do have timing ability, they will tend to carry out more 
stock financed acquisitions when stock prices are high, and so weighting each time period 
equally will ignore this important aspect of timing.  This will tend to understate the (negative) 
significance of stock-financing acquirer returns – in short, precisely the effects we see here.  The 
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calendar time analysis confirms the non-significant results for cash financed acquirers.  Last, 
calendar time returns are significantly negative for non-hostile bids, and insignificant for hostile 
bids. 
 
Table 10 presents calendar time returns for two-way partitions by form of financing and bid 
hostility.  In calendar time, only equity-financed non-hostile bids exhibit significant negative 
performance.  Intriguingly, equity-financed hostile bids do better (although not significantly so) 
than cash-financed non-hostile bids in these tests.  Last, cash-financed hostile bids do not exhibit 
performance significantly different from zero, and the scale of the returns implied by the 
intercept is less than half that obtained from the event-time results. 
 
V. Conclusions 
This paper has shown that the poor performance of UK acquirers can be explained neither by 
biases in the estimation of long run abnormal returns, nor mis-specification of test statistics 
resulting from forming portfolios in event time rather than calendar time.  We have also shown 
that using a conditional form of the three-factor model leads to qualitatively similar results.  
Thus we conclude that the “bad model” problem does not affect our central conclusion that UK 
acquirers exhibit under-performance compared to well-specified pseudo-portfolios. 
 
This is an important results because it confirms that the UK experience is similar to that 
suggested by recent US studies, and is not one of zero abnormal performance as suggested by the 
recent work of Higson and Elliott (1998).  On average, UK acquirers have under-performed in a 
manner similar to that shown to apply to US acquirers by Agrawal et al (1992).  Furthermore, we 
have shown that it is equity acquirers that exhibit substantial negative abnormal returns, as 
shown for the US by Loughran and Vijh (1997).  However, whilst we find UK equity financing 
acquirers exhibit significant negative abnormal returns to their US counterparts, we do not find 
that UK cash acquirers earn significant  positive returns. 
 
Our evidence is strongly supportive of the “form of payments” hypothesis suggested by 
Aggrawal and Jaffe (2000).  Importantly, the “natural experiment” suggested by the nature of the 
UK market for corporate control shows that whilst form of payment considerations tend to 
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dominate the nature of the bid (degree of hostility) in determining long-run acquirer returns, the 
inter-action of the form of payment and nature of the bid are important in explaining 
performance.  Equity financed friendly bids exhibit economically and statistically significant 
negative performance under all metrics.  Cash financing hostile bids show some weak evidence 
of exhibiting positive post bid performance, although the conclusions drawn on this are metric 
dependent.   
 
We also provide evidence that acquirers in the highest book-to-market quintiles appear to have 
better performance than other quintile groups.  This finding is compatible with the “performance 
extrapolation” hypothesis of Agrawal and Jaffe (2000), the “value” effect found in Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) and the Sheifer and Vishny (2003) explanation that acquisitions are driven by 
market valuation characteristics.  
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Table 1: Summary data.   Panel A: Acquirers by market capitalization decile and book-to-market quintile. 
DECILE 
QUINTIL
E 
MKT. 
CAP BTM    
MKT. 
CAP % BTM %
MKT. 
CAP BTM
MKT. 
CAP 
% 
BTM 
% 
MKT. 
CAP BTM
MKT. 
CAP 
% 
BTM 
% 
MKT. 
CAP BTM
MKT. 
CAP 
% 
BTM 
% 
MKT. 
CAP BTM
MKT. 
CAP % BTM %
Group   Overall Overall Overall Overall Cash Cash Cash Cash 
Non-
cash 
Non-
cash 
Non-
cash 
Non-
cash Hostile Hostile Hostile Hostile
Non-
hostile
Non-
hostile
Non-
hostile
Non-
hostile
1    197 118 40.5% 24.3% 73 22 61.9% 18.6% 124 96 33.7% 26.1% 53 30 46.5% 26.3% 144 88 38.7% 23.7%
2    110 116 22.6% 23.9% 21 24 17.8% 20.3% 89 92 24.2% 25.0% 29 26 25.4% 22.8% 81 90 21.8% 24.2%
3    69 106 14.2% 21.8% 14 25 11.9% 21.2% 55 81 14.9% 22.0% 9 23 7.9% 20.2% 60 83 16.1% 22.3%
4    34 90 7.0% 18.5% 4 29 3.4% 24.6% 30 61 8.2% 16.6% 12 23 10.5% 20.2% 22 67 5.9% 18.0%
5    28 56 5.8% 11.5% 3 18 2.5% 15.3% 25 38 6.8% 10.3% 6 12 5.3% 10.5% 22 44 5.9% 11.8%
6 18  3.7%  1  0.8%  17  4.6%      3 2.6% 15 4.0%
7 13  2.7%  0  0.0%  13  3.5%      1 0.9% 12 3.2%
8 8  1.6%  1  0.8%  7  1.9%  0  0.0%  8  2.2%  
9 5  1.0%  1  0.8%  4  1.1%  0  0.0%  5  1.3%  
10 4  0.8%  0  0.0%  4  1.1%  1  0.9%  3  0.8%  
Total 486 486 100% 100% 118 118 100% 100% 368 368 100% 100% 114 114 100% 100% 372 372 100% 100%
 
Panel B: Proportion of bidders in each book to market quintile choosing cash, equity or mixed financing 
TYPE           N MEAN N MEAN N MEAN N MEAN N MEAN
Quintile 1. (low BTM) 2 3 4
5.(high
BTM)
CASH 118 18.64% 116 20.69% 106 23.59% 90 32.22% 56 32.14%
EQUITY 118 69.49% 116 68.10% 106 62.26% 90 57.78% 56 53.57%
MIXED 118 11.86% 116 11.21% 106 14.15% 90 10.00% 56 14.29%
 
Table 2: Event time returns from FF 3-factor model.  Results are Jensen alphas (monthly).  Sub-analyses are presented by form of 
financing, bid hostility and book-to-market ratio of acquirer. 
Panel A        
        
        
    
    
   
  
    
   
     
  
        
       
       
 
   
        
       
       
 
   
. .
Sub-
analysis Overall Overall Overall Overall . . .
Factor Rm-Rf SMB
 
HML
 
Alpha . . .
Mean 1.0942 0.6057 0.0468 -0.0017 . . .
t-test 66.1212
 
 14.6758
 
 1.1965
 
-2.2638
 
. . .
Panel B . .
Sub-
analysis 
 
Cash Bid 
 
Equity bid 
 
Mixed bid
 
Hostile 
Non-
hostile . .
. alpha alpha
 
alpha
 
alpha alpha . .
Mean -0.0008 -0.0021 -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0020 . .
t-test -0.5114
 
-2.1943
 
-0.7522
 
-0.5464
 
-2.3827
 
. .
Panel C 
Sub-
analysis
 
Overall Overall Overall Overall Overall Overall Overall
. BTM1 BTM2 BTM3 BTM4 BTM5 Glamour
 
Value
. alpha alpha
 
alpha
 
alpha alpha alpha alpha
Mean -0.0026 -0.0051 -0.0004 0.0006 0.0017 -0.0039 0.0010 
t-test -1.4153
 
-3.7393
 
-0.2304
 
0.4768
 
1.0802
 
-3.3539
 
1.0653 
 Panel D 
Sub-
analysis
 
Equity Equity Equity Equity Equity Overall Overall
. BTM1 BTM2 BTM3 BTM4 BTM5 Glamour
 
Value
. alpha alpha
 
alpha
 
alpha alpha alpha alpha
Mean -0.0028 -0.0054 -0.0007 0.0005 0.0008 -0.0041 0.0006 
t-test -1.2675 -3.2292 -0.2405 0.3613 0.3996 -2.9501 0.5339 
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Table 3: Event time returns from conditional FF 3-factor model.  Results are Jensen alphas (monthly).  Sub-analyses are presented 
by form of financing, bid hostility and book-to-market ratio of acquirer. 
Panel A        
        
        
    
      
   
  
    
   
     
  
        
       
       
 
   
        
       
       
 
   
. .
Sub-
analysis Overall Overall Overall Overall . . .
Factor Rm-Rf SMB
 
HML
 
Alpha . . .
Mean 1.0951 1.9686 0.1980 -0.0017 . . .
t-test 59.9787
 
2.3035
 
0.2829
 
-2.1948
 
. . .
Panel B . .
Sub-
analysis 
 
Cash Bid 
 
Equity bid 
 
Mixed bid
 
Hostile 
Non-
hostile . .
. alpha alpha
 
alpha
 
alpha alpha . .
Mean -0.0006 -0.0023 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0023 . .
t-test -0.3306
 
-2.3023
 
-0.5910
 
-0.2116
 
-2.4781
 
. .
Panel C 
Sub-
analysis
 
Overall Overall Overall Overall Overall Overall Overall
. BTM1 BTM2 BTM3 BTM4 BTM5 Glamour
 
Value
. alpha alpha
 
alpha
 
alpha alpha alpha alpha
Mean -0.0030 -0.0044 -0.0006 0.0003 0.0014 -0.0037 0.0007 
t-test -1.4911
 
-3.4766
 
-0.2932
 
0.2599
 
0.9083
 
-3.1211
 
0.7840 
 Panel D 
Sub-
analysis
 
Equity Equity Equity Equity Equity Overall Overall
. BTM1 BTM2 BTM3 BTM4 BTM5 Glamour
 
Value
. alpha alpha
 
alpha
 
alpha alpha alpha alpha
Mean -0.0032 -0.0047 -0.0015 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0039 0.0002 
t-test -1.5155 -2.9485 -0.4633 0.1336 0.1185 -2.9680 0.1784 
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Table 4: Overall bidder returns Figures show bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistic and excess returns.  Significance levels are 
shown for the t-statistics and for the Lyon et al (1999) pseudo-portfolio sampling method. Significance levels are denoted by * (10%), 
**(5%), and ***(1%) using two-tailed tests.  BTMS denotes book-to-market and sized matched excess returns, whilst size-matched 
denotes excess returns benchmarked against decile portfolios only. 
Panel A: Overall results 
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-
statistics: BTMS matched 
No. of 
Observation
s 
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-
statistics: Size-matched 
No. of 
Observation
s 
Year 1 T-statistic -2.05504 ** 486 Year 1 T-statistic -2.34277 *** 486
Year 3 T-statistic -4.53277 *** 486 Year 3 T-statistic -5.05093 *** 486
Year 5 T-statistic -3.5939 *** 486 Year 5 T-statistic -4.30281 *** 486
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results: 
BTMS matched . 
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results: 
Size-matched . 
Year 1 Excess bidder return -0.03188 ** 486 Year 1 Excess bidder return -0.03666 ** 486
Year 3 Excess bidder return -0.1513 *** 486 Year 3 Excess bidder return -0.17123 *** 486
Year 5 Excess bidder return -0.21231 *** 486 Year 5 Excess bidder return -0.25559 *** 486
 
Panel B: Results partitioned on book-to-market quintile – BTMS matched 
 
Quintile/no. obs in 
quintile 1 118 2 116 3 106 4 90 5 56
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics: 
   
        
     
     
     
    
     
     
     
Year Statistic Value Sig. level Value Sig. level
 
 Value Sig. level
 
 Value Sig. level
 
 Value Sig. level
 Year 1 T-statistic -1.60275 ns -0.88012 ns -1.01028 ns -1.98242 * 1.541671 ns
Year 3 T-statistic -2.1434 * -2.25774 ** -1.80637 * -3.28174 *** -0.51297 ns
Year 5 T-statistic -1.68823 ns -1.92373
 
* -1.32902
 
ns -2.42343
 
** -0.01902
 
ns
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results: 
Year 1 
Excess bidder 
return -0.05976 ns -0.02691 ns -0.0341 ns -0.0552 * 0.058296 ns
Year 3 
Excess bidder 
return -0.16979 * -0.14684 * -0.1162 * -0.23653 *** -0.05102 ns
Year 5 Excess bidder -0.20362 ns -0.29611 *** -0.1583 ns -0.30888 ** -0.00408 ns
 28
return 
 
 29
Panel C: Results partitioned on book-to-market quintile – size matched 
 
Quintile/no. obs in 
quintile 1 118 2 116 3 106 4 90 5 56
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics: 
   
        
     
     
     
    
     
     
     
Year Statistic Value Sig. level Value Sig. level
 
 Value Sig. level
 
 Value Sig. level
 
 Value Sig. level
 Year 1 T-statistic -2.69516 ** -2.00466 * -0.56972 ns -0.66475 ns 2.605857 **
Year 3 T-statistic -3.6001 ** -3.68392 *** -1.61986 ns -1.6844 ns 0.744349 ns
Year 5 T-statistic -3.30671 *** -2.5874
 
** -1.45673
 
ns -1.12569
 
ns 1.171669
 
ns
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results: 
Year 1 
Excess bidder 
return -0.10102 *** -0.06246 * -0.02028 ns -0.01766 ns 0.090812 ns
Year 3 
Excess bidder 
return -0.30721 *** -0.26079 *** -0.10077 ns -0.10859 ns 0.066792 ns
Year 5 
Excess bidder 
return -0.40311 *** -0.48566 *** -0.16604 ns -0.12667 ns 0.155143 ns
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Table 5: Bidder excess returns by form of payment. Figures show bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistic and excess returns.  
Significance levels are shown for the t-statistics and for the Lyon et al (1999) pseudo-portfolio sampling method. Significance levels 
are denoted by * (10%), **(5%), and ***(1%) using two-tailed tests.   
Panel A: BTM and size-matched 
 
Classification/no. 
obs in class Equity 309 Cash 118 mixed 
 
59
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics: 
   
  
  
   
   
  
   
   
   
  
  
   
   
  
   
Year Statistic Value Sig. Level
 
Value Sig. Level
 
Value Sig. Level
 Year 1 T-statistic -2.60527 ** -0.01634 ns 0.669567 ns
Year 3 T-statistic -5.37981 *** -0.34902 ns -1.0129 ns
Year 5 T-statistic -4.53835 *** 0.46846
 
ns -1.59562
 
ns
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results: 
Year 1 
Excess bidder 
return -0.05346 *** -0.0011 ns 0.019621 ns
Year 3 
Excess bidder 
return -0.20731 *** -0.0264 ns -0.10775 ns
Year 5 
Excess bidder 
return -0.30515 *** 0.056245 ns -0.2632 ns
 
Panel B: Size-matched 
 
Classification/no. 
obs in class Equity 309 Cash 118 mixed 
 
59
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics: 
   Year Statistic Value Sig. Level
 
Value Sig. Level
 
Value Sig. Level
 Year 1 T-statistic -2.77644 *** 0.020836 ns 0.175367 ns
Year 3 T-statistic -6.01467 *** -0.29984 ns -0.95471 ns
Year 5 T-statistic -5.25016 *** 0.314019
 
ns -1.60064
 
ns
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results: 
Year 1 
Excess bidder 
return -0.05869 *** 0.000157 ns 0.005072 ns
Year 3 Excess bidder -0.24124 *** -0.02172 ns -0.10355 ns 
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return 
Year 5 
Excess bidder 
return -0.36352 ***   0.03472 ns -0.27096 ns
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Table 6: Bidder results partitioned on book-to-market quintile. Figures show bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistic and 
excess returns.  Significance levels are shown for the t-statistics and for the Lyon et al (1999) pseudo-portfolio sampling method. 
Significance levels are denoted by * (10%), **(5%), and ***(1%) using two-tailed tests.   
Panel 1A: Equity bidder results – BTM and size matched 
 
Quintile/no. obs in 
quintile 1 82 2 79 3 66 4 52 5 30
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics: 
   
        
     
     
     
    
    
     
     
        
     
     
     
    
   
     
     
Year Statistic Value Sig. level Value Sig. level
 
 Value Sig. level
 
 Value Sig. level
 
 Value Sig. level
 Year 1 T-statistic -2.73502 *** -1.50981 ns -0.31395 ns -1.94512 * 1.145492 ns
Year 3 T-statistic -4.17478 *** -2.00484 * -1.77896 ns -2.85727 ** -0.85609 ns
Year 5 T-statistic -3.31441 *** -2.58902
 
** -1.27203
 
ns -2.75843
 
** -0.31162
 
ns
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results: 
Year 1 
Excess bidder 
return -0.11827 ** -0.05124 ns -0.0163 Bidders: -0.07049 * 0.065571 ns
Year 3 
Excess bidder 
return -0.31717 *** -0.1457 * -0.16051 * -0.24686 *** -0.10364 ns
Year 5 
Excess bidder 
return -0.39207 *** -0.31845 *** -0.2374 ** -0.38134 ** -0.04951 ns
 Panel 1B: Equity bidder results – size matched 
 
Quintile/no. obs in 
quintile 1 82 2 79 3 66 4 52 5 30
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics: 
   Year Statistic Value Sig. level Value Sig. level
 
 Value Sig. level
 
 Value Sig. level
 
 Value Sig. level
 Year 1 T-statistic -3.77332 *** -2.72111 ** 0.254834 ns -0.61024 ns 2.328995 ns
Year 3 T-statistic -5.8012 *** -3.80008 *** -1.65184 ns -1.05267 ns 0.482759 ns
Year 5 T-statistic -4.38326 *** -4.0493
 
*** -1.31611
 
ns -1.59706
 
ns 0.820986
 
ns
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results: 
Year 1 
Excess bidder 
return -0.1718 *** -0.09294 *** 0.010686 ns -0.021 ns 0.122679 ns
Year 3 
Excess bidder 
return -0.47948 *** -0.29314 *** -0.14353 ns -0.08202 ns 0.05569 ns
Year 5 Excess bidder -0.5977 *** -0.53569 *** -0.23169 * -0.19317 ns 0.144676 ns
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return 
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Panel 2A: Cash bidder results – BTM and size matched 
 
Quintile/no. obs in 
quintile 1 22 2 24 3 25 4 29 5 18
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics: 
   
        
     
     
     
    
     
     
     
        
     
     
     
    
     
     
     
Year Statistic Value Sig. level Value Sig. level
 
 Value Sig. level
 
 Value Sig. level
 
 Value Sig. level
 Year 1 T-statistic 0.726263 ns 0.329696 ns -2.59873 ** -0.22686 ns 0.633771 ns
Year 3 T-statistic 1.887877 ns -1.13137 ns -0.59227 ns -1.69454 ns 0.798332 ns
Year 5 T-statistic 1.80422 ns 0.126832
 
ns -0.16524
 
ns -1.20789
 
ns 0.869261
 
ns
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results: 
Year 1 
Excess bidder 
return 0.061165 ns 0.024339 ns -0.09467 ** -0.01266 ns 0.037467 ns
Year 3 
Excess bidder 
return 0.41348 ns -0.21505 ns -0.05166 ns -0.24224 * 0.070305 ns
Year 5 
Excess bidder 
return 0.607077 ns 0.009812 ns -0.0195 ns -0.30847 ns 0.137714 ns
 
Panel 2B: Cash bidder results – size matched 
 
Quintile/no. obs in 
quintile 1 22 2 24 3 25 4 29 5 18
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics: 
   Year Statistic Value Sig. level Value Sig. level
 
 Value Sig. level
 
 Value Sig. level
 
 Value Sig. level
 Year 1 T-statistic 0.541903 ns 0.220851 ns -2.97309 *** 0.26923 ns 0.908505 ns
Year 3 T-statistic 1.616216 ns -1.2388 ns -0.85833 ns -1.20729 ns 1.543781 ns
Year 5 T-statistic 1.110423 ns -0.16073
 
ns -0.82935
 
ns -0.51479
 
ns 1.624557
 
ns
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results: 
Year 1 
Excess bidder 
return 0.04408 ns 0.015611 ns -0.10395 * 0.011772 ns 0.051749 ns
Year 3 
Excess bidder 
return 0.32515 * -0.2488 ns -0.07213 ns -0.15801 ns 0.146683 ns
Year 5 
Excess bidder 
return 0.366329 ns -0.11751 ns -0.10556 ns -0.12034 ns 0.277044 ns
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Table 7: Bidder returns partitioned by hostility. Figures show bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistic and excess returns.  
Significance levels are shown for the t-statistics and for the Lyon et al (1999) pseudo-portfolio sampling method. Significance levels 
are denoted by * (10%), **(5%), and ***(1%) using two-tailed tests.   
Panel A: BTM and size-matched 
 
Classification/no. 
obs in class 
Non-
hostile 372 Hostile 
114
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics: 
   
 
Year Statistic Value Sig. Level
 
Value 
  
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
Sig. Level
 Year 1 T-statistic -2.56712 *** 0.203052 ns
Year 3 T-statistic -4.83495 *** -0.60358 ns
Year 5 T-statistic -3.37338 *** -1.12108
 
ns
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results: 
Year 1 
Excess bidder 
return -0.04378 *** 0.006963 ns
Year 3 
Excess bidder 
return -0.18426 *** -0.04375 ns
Year 5 
Excess bidder 
return -0.23592 *** -0.13526 ns
 
Panel B: Size-matched 
 
Classification/no. 
obs in class 
Non-
hostile 372 Hostile 
114
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics: 
   
 
Year Statistic Value Sig. Level
 
Value Sig. Level
 Year 1 T-statistic -2.83449 *** 0.073951 ns
Year 3 T-statistic -5.13689 *** -1.23991 ns
Year 5 T-statistic -3.76408 *** -1.84514
 
*
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results: 
Year 1 
Excess bidder 
return -0.04858 *** 0.002204 ns
Year 3 Excess bidder -0.19475 *** -0.09447 ns 
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Year 5 
Excess bidder 
return -0.26498 ***  -0.22495 ns
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Table 8: Bidder returns partitioned by hostility and form of financing. Figures show bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistic 
and excess returns.  Significance levels are shown for the t-statistics and for the Lyon et al (1999) pseudo-portfolio sampling method. 
Significance levels are denoted by * (10%), **(5%), and ***(1%) using two-tailed tests.   
Panel A: BTM and size-matched 
 Classification/no. obs in class 
Equity 
Non-
hostile  
    
 
    
    
  
    
   
   
   
239 Equity Hostile
 
70 
Cash Non-
hostile 
 
 
97 
 
Cash 
Hostile 
 
 
21 
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics: 
Year Statistic Value 
Sig. 
Level Value
Sig. 
Level 
 
Value 
Sig. 
Level 
 
Value 
Sig. 
Level 
 Year 1 T-statistic -2.7123 *** -0.63179 ns -0.63697 ns 1.397333 ns
Year 3 T-statistic -5.42128 *** -1.26032 ns -1.07078 ns 1.247969 ns
Year 5 T-statistic -4.05489 *** -1.77465 * -0.23534 ns 1.577418 ns
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results: 
Year 1 Excess bidder return -0.05948 *** -0.03291 ns -0.02287 ns 0.099468 ns 
Year 3 Excess bidder return -0.23732 *** -0.10484 ns -0.08473 ns 0.242982 ns 
Year 5 Excess bidder return -0.32903 *** -0.22361 ns -0.04011 ns 0.501299 * 
Panel B: Size-matched 
 Classification/no. obs in class 
Equity 
Non-
hostile 239 Equity Hostile
 
70 
Cash Non-
hostile 
 
 
97 
 
Cash 
Hostile 
 
 
21 
Bootstrapped Skewness-adjusted t-statistics: 
Year Statistic Value 
Sig. 
Level Value
Sig. 
Level Value 
Sig. 
Level Value 
Sig. 
Level 
Year 1 T-statistic -2.90639 *** -0.68279 ns -0.55294ns 1.294683ns
Year 3 T-statistic -5.87395 *** -1.97757 * -1.05582ns 1.312384ns
Year 5 T-statistic -4.55105 *** -2.41845 ** -0.41134ns 1.729451ns
Pseudo Portfolio Sampling results: 
Year 1 Excess bidder return -0.06506 ** -0.03697 ns -0.01896ns 0.088468ns 
Year 3 Excess bidder return -0.25742 *** -0.186 ns -0.0784ns 0.240093ns 
Year 5 Excess bidder return -0.37015 *** -0.34087 * -0.06485ns 0.494655ns 
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Table 9. Fama-French 3 factor and Conditional Fama-French 3 factor models in 
calendar time: Full sample results.  Independent variables for both models are as 
described in expressions (4) and (5) in the text respectively.  The dependent variable 
is the 60-month calendar time excess return.  T-statistics are in italics. Significance 
levels are denoted by * (10%), **(5%), and ***(1%) using two-tailed tests.   
Panel A – unconditional results 
VARIABLE Overall Equity Cash 
Non-
hostile Hostile 
MKTXS 1.0605 1.0409 1.0716 1.0634 1.0677
 43.72 30.54 31.48 39.04 35.36
 *** *** *** *** *** 
SMB 0.63722 0.69601 0.44674 0.67398 0.46664
 11.64 8.943 6.413 10.9 7.063
 *** *** *** *** *** 
HML 6.63E-02 8.89E-02 4.65E-02 0.12951 -7.17E-02
 1.114 1.264 0.6881 2.049 -1.005
       **   
CONSTAN
T -3.02E-03 -3.70E-03 -1.37E-03 -3.90E-03 3.58E-04
 -2.693 -2.394 -0.9019 -2.917 0.2316
 *** **   ***   
R-SQUARE 0.8969 0.8062 0.8231 0.8531 0.8194
Panel B – conditional results 
VARIABLE Overall Equity Cash 
Non-
hostile Hostile 
MKTXS 0.97771 1.0076 0.85194 0.89797 1.1164
 7.395 4.905 5.201 6.232 9.06
 *** *** *** *** *** 
SMB 0.64692 0.70431 0.45378 0.68286 0.47994
 12.18 9.187 6.577 11.34 7.552
 *** *** *** *** *** 
HML 6.67E-02 9.12E-02 5.26E-02 0.13307 -8.12E-02
 1.154 1.315 0.8063 2.162 -1.166
       **   
TBRRM -0.76427 -0.2799 0.43884 0.69861 -3.5257
 -0.4425 -0.1259 0.2064 0.3523 -2.177
         ** 
TERMRM -5.0865 -5.5494 -3.7228 -3.9016 -7.5119
 -2.671 -1.834 -1.345 -1.641 -2.927
 *** *   * *** 
DYRM 3.8342 1.6306 4.0082 2.2352 7.4117
 1.126 0.3279 1.265 0.6084 2.054
         ** 
CONSTAN
T -2.90E-03 -3.42E-03 -1.31E-03 -3.68E-03 2.94E-04
 -2.703 -2.305 -0.8581 -2.833 0.199
 *** **   ***   
R-SQUARE 0.904 0.8146 0.8289 0.8598 0.827
Table 10. Fama-French 3 factor and Conditional Fama-French 3 factor models 
in calendar time: Form of financing and hostility subset results.  Dependent and 
independent variables for both models are as described in expressions (4) and (5) in 
the text respectively. The dependent variable is the 60-month calendar time excess 
return. T-statistics are in italics. Significance levels are denoted by * (10%), **(5%), 
and ***(1%) using two-tailed tests.   
Panel A – unconditional results 
Variable 
Equity 
Non 
Equity 
host Cash non cash host
MKTXS 1.051 1.0235 1.0628 1.1076
 25.51 34.33 28.76 27.81
 *** *** *** *** 
SMB 0.79957 0.43055 0.45484 0.43682
 9.065 6.498 6.229 4.727
 *** *** *** *** 
HML 0.17908 -2.03E-02 9.15E-02 -0.10117
 2.177 -0.2704 1.213 -1.102
 **       
CONSTANT -4.37E-03 1.67E-04 -2.13E-03 3.24E-03
 -2.305 0.1056 -1.316 1.432
 **       
R-SQUARE 0.7474 0.8003 0.7962 0.6963
 
Panel B –conditional results 
Variable 
Equity 
Non 
Equity 
host Cash non cash host
MKTXS 0.96366 0.9459 0.77903 1.2188
 3.642 6.816 4.371 6.515
 *** *** *** *** 
SMB 0.8081 0.42999 0.46107 0.44544
 9.272 6.632 6.42 4.865
 *** *** *** *** 
HML 0.18355 -1.27E-02 0.10163 -0.11425
 2.224 -0.1842 1.394 -1.268
 **       
TBRRM 0.5538 0.91052 1.4662 -4.0425
 0.1968 0.4885 0.5968 -1.766
       * 
TERMRM -4.8963 -5.2692 -2.6702 -9.3161
 -1.353 -2.305 -0.8796 -3
   **   *** 
DYRM 0.87895 -0.48089 3.0112 7.0954
 0.1452 -0.1062 0.7769 1.71
       * 
CONSTAN
T -4.04E-03 4.92E-04 -2.01E-03 3.10E-03
 -2.176 0.3212 -1.234 1.38
 **       
R-SQUARE 0.7542 0.8094 0.8019 0.7041
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